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NOTES
Warning, This Decision Will Increase the Cost of
Prescription Drugs: How the Supreme Court’s
Misapplication of Preemption Doctrine in Wyeth V. Levine
Portends Devastating Consequences for Oklahoma

I. Introduction
Critics called it a “major setback for business groups”1 and a “cure worse
than gangrene.”2 Supporters said it was a “great day for . . . our Constitution.”3
The Wall Street Journal opined that it was “the mother of all preemption
cases.”4 “It” is Wyeth v. Levine, perhaps the most important and hotly debated
preemption case ever decided by the United States Supreme Court.5 In Wyeth,
the plaintiff, Diana Levine, brought an action under Vermont state law against
drug manufacturer Wyeth Pharmaceuticals for failing to warn of dangers
regarding the administration of the nausea medication Phenergan directly into
a patient’s vein.6 Wyeth defended on the grounds that Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) labeling regulations preempted Levine’s claims.7
Wyeth argued that it would have proved impossible to adhere to a state law
duty to modify Phenergan’s warning label without violating federal law, and
that judicial recognition of such state law claims would impede the objectives
of Congress and the FDA in creating federal labeling regulations.8 Finding
for Levine, the Supreme Court held that FDA labeling requirements did not
preempt the state law claims against Wyeth.9 The Court found that Wyeth
1. Adam Liptak, No Legal Shield in Drug Labeling, Justices Rule, N.Y. TIMES, March 5,
2009, at A1, available at http://nytimes.com/2009/03/05/washington/05scotus.html.
2. Jim Copeland & Paul Howard, Op-Ed., Copeland/Howard: A ‘Cure’ Worse Than
Gangrene, WASH. TIMES, March 9, 2009, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2009/mar/09/a-cure-worse-than-gangrene//print/.
3. Press Release, Doug Kendall, President of Constitutional Accountability Ctr., Statement
on Today’s Supreme Court Ruling in Wyeth v. Levine (March 4, 2009), available at http://
www.theusconstitution.org/page_module.php?id=28&mid=15.
4. Wyeth v. Levine: The Mother of All Preemption Cases, WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG
(Sept. 19, 2008, 8:21 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2008/09/19/wyeth-v-levine-the-motherof-all-preemption-cases/.
5. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
6. Id. at 1191-92.
7. See id. at 1193.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1204.

553

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011

554

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:553

could have complied with Vermont failure-to-warn law without violating its
obligations under FDA regulations,10 that Vermont’s failure-to-warn laws did
not obstruct the purposes and objectives of FDA drug labeling requirements,11
and that the preamble to the 2006 FDA regulations—which asserted that state
laws contrary to the regulations were preempted—did not merit deference.12
This note contends that the decision in Wyeth v. Levine is incorrect. The
Supreme Court abandoned precedent by misapplying preemption doctrine.
The Court erroneously applied the presumption against preemption, and its
reasoning deviated drastically from prior case law. What is more, the Court
ignored important economic and public policy considerations—namely, how
subjecting pharmaceutical companies to liability under state failure-to-warn
laws, despite their compliance with FDA labeling regulations, has the potential
to dramatically increase prescription drug prices, which would prove
especially troublesome for Oklahoma given its population demographics.
Part II of this note discusses the law before Wyeth, focusing on the FDA’s
regulatory framework for prescription drug labeling, evolution of the
preemption doctrine, modern application of preemption doctrine by the
Supreme Court, and Oklahoma’s treatment of FDA labeling requirements visà-vis state law failure-to-warn claims. Part III provides an in-depth overview
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Wyeth v. Levine, highlighting the facts of
the case, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion, and Justice Alito’s dissent. Part
IV analyzes the Court’s holding in Wyeth. Specifically, Part IV argues that the
Court wrongly utilized the presumption against preemption, erroneously failed
to conclude that state failure-to-warn claims upset the purposes and objectives
of FDA drug regulations and thus are preempted by the doctrine of conflict
preemption, and constructed an opinion that is inconsistent with its prior
decision in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co, Inc. Part V explains how
Wyeth is likely to cause a considerable increase in prescription drug prices and
how such an increase would be exceedingly harmful to Oklahoma. Part V also
outlines Wyeth’s impact on Oklahoma tort practitioners, positing that the case
will boost lawsuits against pharmaceutical companies premised on failure-towarn theories, enhancing the Oklahoma tort bar’s business. This note
concludes in Part VI.

10. See id. at 1200-01.
11. See id. at 1199.
12. See id. at 1201-02.
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II. The Law Before Wyeth
A. FDA Regulation of Prescription Drug Labeling
The modern version of the FDA’s regulatory scheme for prescription drug
labeling originated with enactment of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of
1938 (FDCA), which was adopted by Congress to protect the public health and
stop the sale of misbranded or adulterated drugs through enforcement of
standards mandating purity and effectiveness.13 Congress has expanded the
FDCA over the past six decades and the primary regulation governing
prescription drug labeling today is the New Drug Approval Process. This
standard requires labels to contain the name of the drug and the manufacturer’s
place of business, “adequate directions for use, adequate warnings against
dangerous use, and sufficient warnings against unsafe dosage.”14 In 2006, the
FDA announced additional requirements for prescription drug labeling under
the New Drug Approval process, which apply to all drugs approved after
2001.15 The 2006 requirements introduced three changes: (1) addition of a
“Highlights” section, which provides ready access to a drug’s “most
commonly referenced material;”16 (2) reorganization of the graphical contents
of labeling;17 and (3) increased accessibility of warning and adverse reaction
information.18
The FDA has described the New Drug Approval Process as “one of giveand-take with oversight by the FDA.”19 Under the New Drug Approval
Process, the FDA approves proposed labeling following review of an
application submitted to the FDA by the drug manufacturer.20 The FDA
investigates evidence submitted by the manufacturer, as well as other relevant
information,21 and the drug manufacturer and the FDA typically discuss the
proposed labeling in detail, particularly as it relates to the warnings to be
included.22
Based on known scientific evidence, the FDA and the
13. Mary J. Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA,
48 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1100 (2007) (outlining requirements of the federal food and drug laws).
14. See id. at 1101-02.
15. See id. at 1106.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 1105.
20. See id. at 1104.
21. Id. (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellant
at 5, Motus v. Pfizer Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (2004)(no. 02-55372), 2002 WL 32303084)(noting that
the FDA does not explain what it means by “other relevant information”).
22. See id.
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manufacturer then formulate labeling incorporating the appropriate warnings
while attempting to avoid any statement of unsubstantiated risks that could
deter use of the drug.23 In the event that a pharmaceutical company does not
complete the New Drug Approval process as outlined, the FDA can designate
the drug misbranded and assess severe penalties against the company for
selling it, including seizure of the drug from the market.24
The FDA has also established a process whereby drug manufacturers, in
specific circumstances, can change existing labels to reflect newly acquired
information without having to await approval of another application under the
New Drug Approval process.25 The “changes being effected” regulation
provides that the holder of an approved application may commence
distribution of the drug that is the subject of the proposed labeling change
upon receipt by the FDA of a supplemental application if the proposed change
is to, among other things, “add or strengthen a contraindication, warning,
precaution, or adverse reaction.”26
B. Evolution of Preemption Doctrine
Preemption doctrine derives from the Supremacy Clause, found in Article
IV of the United States Constitution.27 The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or the laws of any State to
the contrary notwithstanding.28
Despite the Supremacy Clause’s command for broad federal authority, the
Supreme Court has traditionally proved reluctant to find federal preemption
of state laws due to respect for state sovereignty in our federalist system.29

23. See id. at 1104-05.
24. See id. at 1101-02.
25. See id. at 1105.
26. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) (2008). The “changes being effected” regulation
is particularly significant because it served as one basis for the Wyeth court’s conclusion that
FDA drug labeling regulations did not preempt Levine’s state law action. See Wyeth v. Levine,
129 S. Ct. 1187, 1197 (2009).
27. See Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme
Court Allow States to Regulated Managed Care? 74 TUL. L. REV. 951, 960 (2000) (describing
preemption analysis).
28. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (second emphasis added).
29. See Bogan, supra note 27, at 961.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss3/4

2011]

NOTES

557

Therefore, there is a presumption against preemption.30 Courts will give
federal law preemptive effect only when Congress displays a clear desire for
preemption.31
The Court enumerated three categories of preemption in Savage v. Jones.32
The first category is “express preemption, where Congress explicitly defines
the extent to which its enactments preempt state law.”33 The second category
is field preemption.34 Field preemption occurs when “state law attempts to
regulate . . . a field that Congress intended the federal law exclusively to
occupy.”35 The final category of preemption is conflict preemption.36 Conflict
preemption arises when “it is impossible to comply with both state and federal
requirements, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of” Congress’s purposes and objectives.37
C. Modern Application of Preemption Doctrine by the Supreme Court
1. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.
In the 2000 case of Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., the Supreme
Court considered a lawsuit brought by an injured motorist against an
automobile manufacturer under District of Columbia tort law.38 The motorist
argued that the manufacturer was negligent because it failed to design a
driver’s side airbag in her vehicle, a 1987 Honda Accord.39 In 1984, however,
the Department of Transportation (DOT), “under the authority of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,” had announced a Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) “requiring auto manufacturers to
equip some but not all of their 1987 vehicles with passive restraints,40 which
included airbags and automatic seatbelts.41 The Court thus had to decide
whether the safety standard issued by the DOT, which did not require
30. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“Congress legislated
here in field which the States have traditionally occupied. So we start with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act. . . .”).
31. See Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)
(noting that “[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone” in every preemption case).
32. See 225 U.S. 501 (1912) (holding that state law requiring manufacturer of medicinal
feed to disclose ingredients was not preempted by federal law).
33. Indus. Truck Ass’n v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1997).
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. 529 U.S. 861, 865 (2000).
39. See id. at 865.
40. Id. at 864-65.
41. See id. at 878.
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automobile manufacturers to include airbags in all 1987 cars, preempted the
motorist’s state common-law tort claim.42
In a 5-4 decision,43 the Court held that the 1984 FMVSS preempted the state
law claim under the category of conflict preemption.44 Writing for the Court,
Justice Breyer found that the DOT had made clear its desire not to require
inclusion of airbags in every 1987 automobile.45 Rather, the DOT had
determined that it could best promote safety by allowing manufacturers to
choose from a range of different restraint devices (e.g., automatic seatbelts and
ignition interlock devices, as well as airbags).46 The Court found that
determination to be premised on several significant considerations, such as the
belief that airbags could not make up for all of the dangers caused by
unbuckled seatbelts, the intrusiveness of and public dislike for seatbelts and
airbags, the danger that airbags pose to children and other out-of-position
occupants in small cars, and the high cost of airbags compared to other
restraint devices.47 Because the motorist’s state law action depended on a
finding that the manufacturer was negligent in failing to install an airbag in the
motorist’s 1987 vehicle, the action—if successful—would create a new duty
on automobile manufacturers who marketed their new vehicles in the District
of Columbia to place airbags in all vehicles.48 Therefore, the state law action
“stood ‘as an obstacle to the accomplishment’” of the DOT’s purposes and
objectives in formulating the 1984 FMVSS—to achieve safety by permitting
manufacturers to vary the types of restraint devices they placed in their
automobiles.49
2. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee
A year after it decided Geier, the Supreme Court heard another high-profile
preemption case: Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee.50 Buckman
centered on a state law fraud claim.51 The plaintiffs alleged to have suffered
injuries from the implantation of orthopedic screws into their spines.52 The
plaintiffs contended that the consultant to the manufacturer of the screws had

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 865.
See id. at 863.
See id. at 886.
Id. at 863, 875.
See id. at 875-76.
See id. at 877-78.
See id. at 881.
Id. at 881-82 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
531 U.S. 341, 341 (2001).
See id. at 343.
See id.
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obtained Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval for the screws
through misrepresentations to the FDA.53
The Court unanimously54 concluded that “the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA), as amended by the Medical Device Amendments of
1976 (MDA),” preempted the plaintiffs’ state fraud claim.55 Like Geier, the
Court decided Buckman on conflict preemption grounds.56 The Court first
stated that the presumption against preemption did not apply because
“[p]olicing fraud against federal agencies is hardly a field which the States
have traditionally occupied.”57 The Court noted secondly that the federal
statutory scheme empowered “the FDA to punish and deter fraud against” its
agency and that the FDA used this authority “to achieve a somewhat delicate
balance of statutory objectives.”58 In the Court’s view, permitting “fraud-onthe-FDA claims” to proceed under state tort law would disrupt this balance.59
The Court emphasized that mandatory compliance with the FDA’s regulatory
regime and the varying tort regimes of the fifty states would saddle
manufacturers of medical devices with much greater burdens than Congress
intended in passing the MDA.60 The Court also stated its belief that enabling
similar fraud claims to go forward would cause applicants to submit too much
information to the FDA—thereby slowing the approval process and, in turn,
impeding competition among manufacturers of medical devices.61
D. Oklahoma’s Treatment of FDA Labeling Requirements and State Law
Tort Claims
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Wyeth, a federal district court in
Oklahoma weighed in on the issue of whether FDA labeling regulations
preempt state law tort claims. In Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, the United
States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma considered an
action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals,
alleging that the plaintiff’s husband had committed suicide as a consequence
of taking a prescription antidepressant drug manufactured by Wyeth.62 The
53. See id.
54. See id. at 342.
55. Id. at 344 (citations omitted).
56. See id. at 348.
57. Id. at 347 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
58. Id. at 348.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 350.
61. See id. at 351.
62. Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1277 (W.D. Okla. 2008), vacated 606
F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2010).
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plaintiff argued that the defendant was liable to her for damages under
Oklahoma common law because it had failed to adequately warn that the drug
her husband took, Effexor, could lead to suicidal thoughts and feelings.63 The
defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that FDA
prescription-drug-labeling regulations preempted the plaintiff’s claims.64
Specifically, the defendant claimed that the FDA had concluded that scientific
evidence did not support attaching a warning of suicide to Effexor, and
therefore, it could not issue such a warning in order to comply with Oklahoma
law, without violating federal law.65 The plaintiff argued that the FDA
regulations did not preempt Oklahoma law because the regulations permitted
the defendant to change its label to include the suicide warning without FDA
approval.66
The district court held that FDA prescription drug labeling regulations did
in fact preempt Oklahoma tort law under the category of conflict preemption.67
The court focused its attention on two issues: (1) the history of the FDA’s
regulation of antidepressants, and (2) the FDA’s position on preemption, as
reflected by the preamble to its 2006 regulations.68 Concerning the former, the
Dobbs court found that the FDA had conclusively determined that warnings
about the potential for suicide were unwarranted because scientific evidence
did not support a strong enough connection between use of antidepressants and
suicide.69 The court based this finding on the writings of the FDA
Psychopharmacological Drugs Advisory Committee, which convened for the
express purpose of studying the potential link between antidepressant use and
suicide, and had determined that no link existed.70 The court also based its
finding on numerous amicus curiae briefs filed by the FDA in other failure-towarn cases stating that evidence did not show consumption of antidepressants
was connected to suicide.71 Accordingly, a state law determination that such
a warning was necessary created a conflict “between federal and state law, and
impose[d] inconsistent federal and state obligations.”72
As to the FDA’s position on preemption, the Dobbs court afforded
significant weight to the FDA’s judgment in the 2006 preamble that state

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id at 1277.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1279-80, 1289-91.
See id. at 1280, 1285-86.
Id. at 1283-84.
See id. at 1282-83.
Id. at 1282-84.
Id. at 1289-90.
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failure-to-warn claims conflicted with FDA regulations.73 Citing Chevron
USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,74 the court rejected the
plaintiff’s argument that the FDA’s change in position from 2000 (when the
FDA stated on record that its regulations did not preempt state law failure-towarn claims) meant the 2006 preamble was entitled to no deference.75
Additionally, the Dobbs court was not persuaded by the conclusion of other
courts that the 2006 preamble was “contrary to the regulations’ imposition [on]
drug manufacturers of a continuing duty to monitor the safety of their products
. . . .”76 The court stressed that manufacturers could still change their labels to
reflect previously unknown or new risks, as opposed to risks the FDA had
already analyzed.77 Thus, the court found that the FDA’s position on
preemption, as reflected in the 2006 preamble, was reasonable, supported by
law, and entitled to deference.78
III. Wyeth v. Levine
A. Facts and Procedural History
On April 7, 2000, Diana Levine visited her local clinic to obtain treatment
for a migraine headache.79 Levine “received an intramuscular injection of
Demerol for her headache and Phenergan,” an antihistamine manufactured by
Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, for nausea.80 The treatment given to Levine did not
provide her relief, so she returned later the same day to receive a second
injection of both Demerol and Phenergan.81 For Levine’s second injection, the
attending physician administered the drugs via the “IV-push” method, in
which “the drug is injected directly into a patient’s vein,” rather than first
73. See id. at 1289. In the 2006 preamble, the FDA stated “that state law claims concerning
drug labeling ‘conflict with and stand as an obstacle to the achievement of full objectives and
purposes of Federal law.’” Id. (quoting 71 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling
for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601)).
74. Dobbs, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 1288 (“The fact that an agency has from time to time
changed its interpretation . . . does not . . . lead us to conclude that no deference should be
accorded to the agency’s interpretation of the statute.”) (quoting Chevron USA Inc., v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984)).
75. Id. at 1287-88 (“Although the FDA’s position regarding preemption since 2000
conflicts with its prior view, the change in position does not require this Court to disregard the
FDA’s current position.”).
76. Id. at 1289.
77. Id.
78. See id. At 1288-89.
79. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 (2009).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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being introduced into a saline solution bag and delivered to the vein through
a catheter, the more common “IV-drip” method.82 During the IV-push
injection Phenergan escaped into Levine’s artery, where it encountered arterial
blood.83 Consequently, Levine developed gangrene, forcing doctors to
amputate her entire right forearm.84
Levine incurred substantial medical expenses, pain and suffering, and the
loss of her career as a professional musician, and she brought an action for
damages against Wyeth.85 Levine based her action on common law negligence
and strict liability theories, alleging that Phenergan’s warning label “was
defective because it [did not] instruct clinicians to use the IV-drip method” in
favor of the IV-push method.86 In response, Wyeth filed a motion for
summary judgment.87 Wyeth contended that federal law preempted Levine’s
failure-to-warn claims on conflict preemption grounds.88 The trial court found
no merit in Wyeth’s conflict preemption argument and the trial proceeded.89
Evidence presented during trial showed that the use of the IV-drip method in
place of the IV-push method could virtually eliminate the risk of intra-arterial
injection.90 The record also contained “correspondence between Wyeth and
the FDA discussing Phenergan’s label.”91 “The FDA first approved injectable
Phenergan in 1955. In 1973 and 1976, Wyeth submitted supplemental drug
applications, which [the FDA] approved after proposing labeling changes.”92
In 1981, after the FDA promulgated new guidance regarding labeling, Wyeth
submitted a third supplemental application.93 Throughout the subsequent
seventeen years, Wyeth corresponded with the FDA intermittently concerning
Phenergan’s label.94 Notably, the FDA suggested different warnings relating
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1191-92. Phenergan’s warning label read, in pertinent part, as follows: “Due to
the close proximity of arteries and veins in the areas most commonly used for intravenous
injection, extreme care should be exercised to avoid perivascular extravasation or inadvertent
intra-arterial injection. Reports compatible with inadvertent intra-arterial injection of Phenergan
Injection, usually in conjunction with other drugs intended for intravenous use, suggest that
pain, severe chemical irritation, severe spasm of distal vessels, and resultant gangrene requiring
amputation are likely under such circumstances.” Id. at 1191 n.1.
87. Id. at 1192.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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to the risk of arterial exposure in 1987.95 In 1988, Wyeth submitted revised
labeling containing the changes proposed by the FDA the previous year.96 The
FDA did not respond until 1996, when it told Wyeth to “[r]etain verbiage in
current label.”97 In 1998, the FDA approved Wyeth’s 1981 supplemental
application.98
At conclusion of the trial, the jury found Wyeth negligent and that
Phenergan was a defective product due to inadequate warnings.99 The jury
awarded Levine damages amounting to $7,400,000.100 Wyeth filed a motion
for judgment as a matter of law.101 The trial court denied Wyeth’s motion,
dismissing its conflict preemption arguments.102 The court found “no direct
conflict between FDA regulations and Levine’s state law claims” because
FDA regulations permit a manufacturer to strengthen its warnings on an
interim basis without approval.103 The trial court also concluded that allowing
Levine’s state law claims to go forward would not impede the FDA’s purposes
and objectives, as “the agency had paid no more than passing attention to”
whether Phenergan should include a warning against using the IV-push
method to administer the drug.104 The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the
ruling of the trial court, holding “that the jury’s verdict did not conflict with
the FDA’s labeling requirements for Phenergan because Wyeth could have
warned against IV-push administration” in the absence of FDA approval.105
Additionally, the Vermont Supreme Court held that “federal labeling
requirements create a floor, not a ceiling, for state regulation.”106
B. Justice Stevens’ Majority Opinion
In a 6-3 decision, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of
the Vermont Supreme Court, finding that FDA prescription drug labeling
regulations did not preempt Diana Levine’s state failure-to-warn claims
pertaining to Phenergan.107
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1193.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1196-97 (2009). Justice Thomas filed an opinion
in which he concurred with the result reached by the majority but criticized the Court’s general
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Regarding Wyeth’s contention that it was impossible to comply with both
state failure-to-warn requirements and its federal labeling duties,108 the
Court—agreeing with the trial court—found that the FDA’s “changes being
effected” (CBE)109 regulation enabled Wyeth to change its label to comply
with Vermont law without violating its obligations under the FDA labeling
requirements.110 The Court noted that, given the evidence presented showing
at least twenty incidents prior to Levine’s injury in which IV-push
administration of Phenergan resulted in gangrene and an amputation, Wyeth
could have—and should have—updated Phenergan’s label to specifically warn
against IV push administration of the drug on the basis that such evidence was
“newly acquired information” under the CBE.111
Next, the Court rejected Wyeth’s contention “that requiring it to comply
with a state-law duty to provide a stronger warning about IV-push
administration would obstruct the purposes and objectives of federal drug
labeling” law and thereby trigger conflict preemption.112 The Court took note
of Congress’s decision to omit an express preemption provision from the FDA
regulations, writing:
;If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its objectives,
it surely would have enacted an express preemption provision at some
point during the FDCA’s [Food and Drug Cosmetic Act] 70-year history.
But despite its 1976 enactment of an express preemption provision for
medical devices, Congress has not enacted such a provision for
prescription drugs.113
The Court also dismissed Wyeth’s claim that the preamble to the 2006 FDA
regulations was entitled to preemptive force.114 The preamble read, in part,
“The FDCA establishes both a ‘floor’ and a ‘ceiling’ . . . FDA approval of
labeling . . . preempts conflicting or contrary State law.”115 The Court listed
three reasons the preamble did not have preemptive effect.116 First, the Court
approach to preemption cases. Cf. id. at 1204-17 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Breyer filed
a concurring opinion emphasizing what he viewed as the narrow application of the majority
opinion and cautioning against the potential economic effect of the majority opinion. Cf. id. at
1204 (Breyer, J., concurring). For purposes of this note, the aforementioned opinions will not
be discussed further.
108. Id. at 1196 (majority opinion).
109. Id.
110. See id. at 1197.
111. Id. 1196-98.
112. Id. at 1199.
113. Id. at 1200.
114. Id. at 1203.
115. Id. at 1200.
116. See id. at 1201-03.
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established that an agency regulation with the force of law could preempt
conflicting state requirements.117 Rather than it being an agency regulation
with the force of law, the Court declared that the preamble was nothing more
than a mere assertion by the FDA.118 Second, the Court did not accord the
preamble preemptive effect because the FDA finalized it “without offering
states or other interested parties notice or opportunity for comment.”119 The
Court noted that the weight it accords to an agency’s explanation of a state
law’s impact on the federal scheme depends on the explanation’s
thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness, and that—in light of the
procedural failure committed by the FDA in failing to provide opportunity for
comment on the preamble—the agency’s views on state law were inherently
suspect.120 Third, the Court found the preamble plainly incongruent with the
FDA’s long-held position that federal labeling standards did not preempt state
tort law.121 The Court highlighted the fact that, prior to Levine’s injury, the
FDA had never so much as implied that state tort law was an obstacle to
achievement of its goals.122 Rather, the FDA had always categorized federal
labeling standards as a minimum threshold “upon which States could build.”123
Wading into a policy argument, the Court outlined the Court’s belief that state
law had traditionally complimented, not obstructed, federal law in the field of
prescription drug labeling by uncovering previously unknown drug hazards
and incentivizing prompt disclosure of safety risks by drug manufacturers.124
Finally, the Court distinguished the case at bar from Geier.125 In the
majority’s judgment, Geier was entirely distinct from the case before the Court
because the DOT in Geier had conducted formal rulemaking before adopting
its regulation; the FDA had not.126 Moreover, the FDA, unlike the DOT in
Geier, had not engaged in a deliberative balancing of state law and federal

117. Id. at 1200.
118. See id. at 1200-01 (“This Court has recognized that an agency regulation with the force
of law can pre-empt conflicting state requirements. . . . We are faced with no such regulation
in this case, but rather with an agency’s mere assertion that state law is an obstacle to achieving
its statutory objectives.”).
119. Id. at 1201.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1201-02.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1202.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 1203 (“Wyeth and the dissent contend that the regulatory scheme in this case
is nearly identical [to Geier], but as we have described, it is quite different.”).
126. Id.
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objectives in determining that state law was preempted.127 Therefore, the
rationale of Geier did not apply.128
C. Justice Alito’s Dissent
Justice Alito disagreed sharply with the majority opinion of Justice Stevens,
filing a forceful dissent joined by Justices Roberts and Scalia.129 The dissent
began by criticizing the majority’s emphasis on Congress’s failure to include
an express preemption provision in the FDCA, stating that “the ordinary
principles of conflict pre-emption turn solely on whether a State has upset the
regulatory balance struck by the federal agency.”130
The dissent next argued that the rationale employed in Geier applied to the
instant case.131 The dissent posited that the FDA’s oversight of Phenergan
(spanning more than fifty years)132 and decision not to mandate inclusion of a
warning concerning IV-push administration on Phenergan’s label was
analogous to the regulatory balance struck by the DOT in formulating the
restraint device regulation that was the subject of the Geier case.133 Both
regulations, Justice Alito wrote, were considered policy judgments.134 Thus,
the majority should have found that the FDA regulations preempted Levine’s
state law claims.135
The dissent took issue with the majority’s analysis relating to the
preemptive effect of the preamble to the 2006 FDA regulations.136 The dissent
pointed out that the Geier court had specifically rejected the majority’s
assertion that the preamble deserved no merit because the FDA had not
conducted appropriate notice and comment rulemaking.137 Further, the dissent
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1218 (Alito, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1220.
131. See id. (“A faithful application of the Court’s conflict preemption cases compels the
conclusion that the FDA’s 40-year-long effort to regulate the safety and efficacy of Phenergan
preempts respondent’s tort suit. Indeed, that result follows directly from our conclusion in
Geier) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1222 (“In its attempt to evade Geier’s applicability to
this case, the Court commits both factual and legal errors.”).
132. See id. at 1222.
133. See id. at 1220-21.
134. See id. at 1218, 1221 (“Rather, the real issue is whether a state tort jury can
countermand the FDA’s considered judgment that Phenergan’s FDA-mandated warning label
renders its intravenous (IV) use ‘safe’.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1222 (“First, as a
factual matter, it is demonstrably untrue that the FDA failed to consider (and strike a ‘balance’
between) the specific costs and benefits associated with IV push.”).
135. See id. at 1221-22.
136. See id. at 1228.
137. Id. at 1227.
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found the majority’s distinction of Geier unpersuasive because the Department
of Transportation’s regulation in that case bore the force of law while the 2006
preamble did not.138 The dissent opined that such a distinction was irrelevant,
as the FDA regulations themselves bore the force of law.139
The dissent concluded by professing the belief that juries were ill-equipped
to perform a cost-benefit analysis of the adequacy of prescription drug
labels.140 Instead, that analysis should have been left to the expertise of the
FDA.141
IV. Wyeth’s Legal Flaws
The Supreme Court’s holding that FDA drug labeling regulations do not
preempt state failure-to-warn lawsuits is incorrect in three important respects.
First, the Wyeth majority erroneously relied on the presumption against
preemption. Second, given the Court’s reasoning in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s
Legal Committee, the Wyeth majority should have found that FDA labeling
requirements preempted Levine’s state law action pursuant to the doctrine of
conflict preemption—lawsuits like Levine’s obstruct the purposes and
objectives of the FDA. Instead, the Court focused heavily on Congress’s
decision to omit an express preemption clause from the original Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and subsequent amendments thereto, confusing the
distinction between express preemption and conflict preemption. Third, the
Court’s holding marks a significant departure from Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co. As the dissent stated, the Court’s reasoning in Geier should have
compelled the Wyeth majority to honor the FDA’s preemption views.
A. The Presumption Against Preemption Should Not Have Applied in
Wyeth
The first flaw in the Wyeth decision is the Court’s misplaced reliance on the
presumption against federal preemption of state laws. The Supreme Court has
established that there is a general presumption against federal preemption of
state laws when Congress legislates “in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied.”142 The states have regulated food and drugs since the
United States’ inception.143 It is the federal government, however, and not the
138. See id. at 1228.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 1229.
141. See id. at 1229-30.
142. Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (emphasis added) (“Because the States
are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does
not cavalierly preempt state-law causes of action.”).
143. See Davis, supra note 13, at 1100 (“The states had regulated the safety of food and
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states, that has historically been the primary regulator of food and drugs sold
in interstate commerce.144
“Federal regulation of food and drugs occurred as early as the midnineteenth century.”145 In 1848, Congress passed the Drug Importation Act,
which required the U.S. Customs Service Inspection to stop entry of
adulterated drugs into the United States.146 In 1906, Congress enacted the Pure
Food and Drug Act.147 The Pure Food and Drug Act prohibited “interstate
commerce in misbranded and adulterated foods, drinks, and drugs.”148 The
states did not resist Congress’s exertion of federal power in passing the Pure
Food and Drug Act, as one would expect if regulation of drugs sold in
interstate commerce were a field the states had traditionally occupied. Rather,
the states implored the federal government to engage in such regulation out of
concern that they [the states] would prove unable to do so sufficiently.149
The Supreme Court confirmed the federal government’s predominance in
regulating prescription drugs in interstate commerce with its ruling in
McDermott v. Wisconsin.150 In McDermott, the Court considered a Wisconsin
state law barring all labeling of food or drugs not permitted by Wisconsin
law.151 Striking down the law, the Court held that it imposed too great a
burden on interstate commerce and directly conflicted with the Pure Food and
Drug Act of 1906.152
Phenergan’s manufacturer (Wyeth), like virtually all prescription drug
manufacturers, sells the drug in interstate commerce. Considering the federal
government’s primacy in regulating food and drugs in interstate commerce, the
Court in Wyeth should not have applied the presumption against preemption
to FDA prescription drug regulations. Had the presumption against
preemption not applied in this case, it is likely the result would have mirrored
that reached by the Court in Buckman, where—operating under an analytical
drugs since the earliest days of the United States’ history.”).
144. See id.
145. Id. at 1099.
146. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ucm128305.htm (last visited
on Nov. 8, 2009).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Davis, supra note 13, at 1100 (citing JAMES T. O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION §§ 3:1-:4 (2d ed. 2005)).
150. 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
151. See John Shaeffer, Prescription Drug Advertising—Should States Regulate What is
False and Misleading?, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 629, 634 (2003) (discussing McDermott v.
Wisconsin).
152. Id.
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framework presupposing no presumption against preemption—the Court found
that the Medical Device Amendments to the FDCA preempted the plaintiffs’
fraud claims under state law.153
B. An Obstruction of the FDA’s Purposes and Objectives: Why the Court
Should Have Found Conflict Preemption Based on Buckman
The second flaw in the Court’s decision is its failure to embrace Buckman
and find that conflict preemption doctrine preempted Levine’s state law claims
against Wyeth. It has long been the Supreme Court’s position that “conflict
preemption occurs when state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress in enacting a
federal law.”154 Although there is no steadfast rule concerning when the Court
will deem state law an impediment to Congress’s purposes and objectives in
legislating, the rationale underlying the 2000 Buckman decision should have
persuaded the Court in Wyeth to hold that state failure-to-warn actions impede
Congress’s purposes and objectives in granting the FDA authority to
promulgate labeling standards for prescription drugs.
In a unanimous opinion, which included all six members of the Wyeth
majority, the Buckman Court held that the Medical Device Amendments
(MDA) to the FDCA preempted a state law action against manufacturers of
orthopedic screws which alleged that the manufacturers defrauded the FDA in
gaining approval of the screws.155 Chief among the Buckman Court’s reasons
for rendering the aforementioned determination was its belief that Congress
enacted the MDA intending to free medical device manufacturers from state
tort regimes.156 Allowing the state fraud claims to proceed would have
abrogated Congress’s purpose for enacting the MDA and created greater
burdens on medical device manufacturers than Congress foresaw, thus
preventing the FDA from executing its responsibility to police fraud.157
Furthermore, the Court believed subjecting medical device manufacturers to
153. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001). The extent of the
paradigm shift that occurs when the presumption against preemption is inapplicable is not
entirely clear. It has been suggested by some, however, that–in the absence of the presumption
against preemption–the Court broadens its definition of what constitutes “conflict” under the
doctrine of conflict preemption. See Mary J. Davis, The New Presumption Against Preemption
61 HASTINGS L.J. 1217, 1252 (2010).
154. Susan D. Hall, Preemption Analysis After Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 90 KY.
L.J. 251, 252 (2002) (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912) (holding that federal law
did not preempt a state law requiring manufacturers of medicinal feed to disclose ingredients)).
155. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 343-44. The Wyeth majority includes Justices Stevens, Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Thomas. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1190 (2009).
156. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 352.
157. Id. at 350.
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state tort regimes would cause manufacturers to submit more information to
the FDA, which would slow the approval process and negatively affect
competition in the medical device industry.158
The Court’s rationale in Buckman is directly applicable to Wyeth. As in
Buckman, there was evidence available to the Wyeth court indicating Congress
did not contemplate that drug makers would be liable under state tort law after
obtaining FDA approval of their labels.159 In fact, the majority itself cited one
piece of evidence supporting the conclusion that Congress desired to shield
drug manufacturers from state tort liability: the first version of the FDCA
provided a federal cause of action to persons injured by prescription drugs.160
More persuasive is the extraordinary breadth of the FDA drug approval
process.161
Taking into account the FDA drug approval process’s
extensiveness, one has difficulty concluding that Congress contemplated a role
for the states in judging drug safety after FDA approval.
Moreover, the Court contended in Buckman that medical device
manufacturers would present the FDA with too much information if subjected
to liability under state tort law, an assertion equally valid in the case of drug
manufacturers. Like medical device manufacturers, drug manufacturers
probably divulge even minimally supported safety information to the FDA
during the approval process as a means of limiting future legal liability.
Therefore, if concern over excessive information submission to the FDA was
sufficient to find state law an impediment to federal objectives and purposes
and trigger conflict preemption in Buckman, the same should have been true
in Wyeth.
Rather than applying Buckman’s analysis, however, the Wyeth court
concentrated on the lack of an express preemption clause in the portion of the
FDCA pertaining to drug regulation.162 Keying on the absence of an express
preemption clause in the FDCA was erroneous given the Court’s prior
statements on the doctrine of conflict preemption, a point Justice Alito
articulated in his dissent.163 By blurring the distinction between express and
conflict preemption with unwarranted attention to the nonexistence of an
158. Id. at 351.
159. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1199-200 (citing H.R. 6110, 73d Cong., § 25 (1st Sess. 1933)).
160. See id.
161. See discussion supra Part II.A.
162. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200 (“If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle
to its objectives, it surely would have enacted an express pre-emption provision at some point
during the FDCA’s 70-year history.”).
163. See id. at 1220 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ordinary principles of conflict pre-emption
turn solely on whether a State has upset the regulatory balance struck by the federal agency.”
(emphasis added)); see also Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S.
311, 317 (1981).
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express preemption provision in the FDCA, the Wyeth court not only
improperly applied conflict preemption doctrine, but also essentially abrogated
conflict preemption doctrine altogether. Henceforth, the Court can apply
conflict preemption only if Congress explicitly declares state law a barrier to
accomplishing its legislative objectives. Such a dismantling of conflict
preemption doctrine indicates that the Court reached the wrong result.
C. Driving Away From Precedent: Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.
Inc. Should Have Compelled Deference to the 2006 FDA Preamble
The final legal shortcoming of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Wyeth is that
the Court did not defer to the FDA’s view on the preemptive force of its
regulations, as reflected by the 2006 FDA preamble.164 Honoring the FDA’s
views concerning the preemptive effect of its regulations is something the
Court should have done in light of its decision in Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co., Inc. In Geier, the Supreme Court declared that the Department of
Transportation’s (DOT) 1984 Federal Motor Vehicle Standard (FMVSS)
preempted an injured motorist’s defective design action against an automobile
manufacturer under District of Columbia tort law.165 The Court’s ruling
stemmed at least in part from its belief that the DOT’s interpretation regarding
the preemptive effect of the FVMSS was entitled to consideration given the
extensive background of its investigation into the merits of automobile safety
devices and the complexity involved in the issue.166
In working with Wyeth Pharmaceuticals to formulate a warning label for
Phenergan, the FDA conducted an investigation as extensive—if not more
so—than the DOT investigation of automobile safety devices in Geier. Justice
Alito offered ample evidence supporting the aforementioned conclusion in his
dissenting opinion in Wyeth. Justice Alito noted that “Phenergan’s warning
label has been subject to the FDA’s strict regulatory oversight since the
1950's” and that the FDA paid particular attention to the safety and
effectiveness of IV-push administration as it related to Phenergan’s warning
label.167 The FDA, moreover, convened meetings with Wyeth specifically
devoted to discussing Phenergan’s warning label and commissioned an
164. In its 2006 preamble, the FDA stated that the FDCA “establishes both a ‘floor’ and a
‘ceiling’ . . . FDA approval of labeling . . . preempts conflicting or contrary State law.” Wyeth,
129 S. Ct. at 1200 (majority opinion).
165. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
for an in-depth explanation of the 1984 Department of Transportation Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard.
166. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 883.
167. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting). For explanation of the IV-push
method, see supra Part III.A.
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advisory committee to study the inherent risks of Phenergan when injected via
the IV-push method of intravenous drug administration.168 Based on the
study’s findings and other research, the FDA instructed Wyeth to place a
warning regarding IV-push on Phenergan’s label.169 The FDA did not,
however, prohibit the IV-push method for administering Phenergan.170
Additionally, the complexity of prescription drug labeling is analogous to
that of automobile safety devices. Both issues require specialized knowledge
and expertise that Congress, state legislatures, the public, and juries are
unlikely to possess. The DOT and FDA occupy a unique position from which
to render considered judgments in the areas of automobile safety devices and
prescription drug labeling, respectively.
The processes by which the DOT established regulations for automobile
safety devices and the FDA decided the permissibility of IV-push
administration of Phenergan are virtually indistinguishable. Thus, the Wyeth
majority’s refusal to give the FDA’s statement that its guidelines preempted
state law—as expressed in the 2006 FDA preamble—the same force it gave
the DOT’s preemption views in Geier was improper.
V. The Implications of Wyeth v. Levine for Oklahoma
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wyeth v. Levine presents two major
implications for Oklahoma. First, Wyeth will lead to an increase in
prescription drug prices. Oklahoma’s senior citizen population, in comparison
to the national average, is proportionately larger than most other states, and
many of those seniors are either uninsured or ineligible for government
programs that subsidize prescription drug purchases.171 Therefore, any
increase in the cost of prescription drugs will affect Oklahoma more than most
states. Second, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Wyeth will prove greatly
beneficial to Oklahoma tort practitioners by making it easier to litigate
successfully against pharmaceutical companies.
A. Wyeth v. Levine Will Increase Prescription Drug Prices
1. Litigation Hinders Pharmaceutical Development
Litigation encumbers pharmaceutical development, which, in turn, causes
an asymmetry between supply and demand—triggering a rise in the cost of
prescription drugs. Litigation hinders pharmaceutical development in two
168.
169.
170.
171.

Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1222.
Id. at 1225.
See id. (“While Phenergan’s label very clearly authorized the use of IV push . . . .”).
See infra Part V.A.4.
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primary ways. First, litigation forces pharmaceutical companies to expend
capital they would otherwise devote to research and development on legal
services.172 The drug industry spends sizable sums hiring in-house and outside
counsel to offer legal advice and defend lawsuits initiated by consumers.173
Further, drug companies must carry liability insurance policies or,
alternatively, self-insure if they deem premiums charged by insurers to be
excessive.174 Secondly, litigation discourages pharmaceutical development
because of its inherent unpredictability.175 Like all businesses, drug companies
must balance risk and reward in determining whether to bring their product to
market, and product liability entails present and future risks that, while
virtually impossible to quantify, could lead to the company’s financial ruin.176
2. A Comparison of the U.S. and Canadian Liability Systems Shows That
Litigation Results in Higher Prescription Drug Prices
Comparing the U.S. and Canadian liability systems illustrates that litigation
directly correlates with higher prescription drug costs. Though the U.S. and
Canada each model their liability system on English common law, the
respective systems have important differences.177 Most importantly, the U.S
has adopted strict products liability while Canada relies solely on a negligence
standard.178 Other distinctions include the advent of market share liability in
the U.S., limited rights of appeal for Canadian litigants compared to their U.S.
counterparts, and fewer punitive damages awards in Canada than in the U.S.179
A 1992 study by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) discovered
large price differences for the same drugs sold in both the U.S. and Canada.180
A sample of 121 commonly prescribed drugs sold in both the U.S. and Canada

172. See Louis Lasagna, The Chilling Effect of Product Liability on New Drug Development,
in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION, 334,
335-36 (Peter W. Hubert & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 337.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Richard L. Manning, Products Liability and Prescription Drug Prices in Canada and
the United States, 40 J.L. & ECON. 203, 206 (1997) (discussing how the United States liability
system has drifted considerably from the common law heritage it shares with the Canadian
system).
178. Id. at 206-07.
179. Id. at 207-08. Market share liability is a theory of damages whereby each defendant
manufacturer of a drug pays a percentage of the plaintiff’s damages equal to their share of the
market, if the court cannot determine which manufacturer is responsible for making the drug
causing the injury.
180. Id. at 204.
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found that the median price was about forty-three percent higher in the U.S.
than in Canada.181 Criticism of the GAO study was widespread, as some
experts believed the study’s methodology was biased in favor of finding higher
prices in the U.S.182 But a study by Professor Richard L. Manning of Brigham
Young University in the Journal of Law and Economics confirms the GAO
study’s conclusion that prescription drug prices are lower in Canada, and
proves that the disparity results from the differing liability systems.183
Professor Manning’s study calculated drug prices based on four variables:
manufacturing and marketing costs, the regulatory environment in which the
company sells its products, the liability environment which prevails in the
market, and the structure of the market for each product.184 Manning
incorporated the effects of the liability environment prevailing in the market
by measuring four risks: litigation history, vaccine liability cost, controlled
substances designation, and risk assessment surveys of health professionals.185
The results indicated that, when accounting for the effects of all four variables,
the price differential between Canada and the United States amounted to “a
mean difference of 69.7 percent and a median difference of 43.6 percent.”186
Removing the liability cost variable, however, resulted in a reduction of the
mean price differential to 35.5 percent and a reduction of the median
difference to 32.6 percent.187 Manning’s study found that the proportion of
cases won by plaintiffs had a particularly substantial effect on price
difference,188 which is notable given that Wyeth will enhance plaintiffs’
chances of prevailing over drug companies in products liability cases by
preventing drug companies from proffering preemption defenses based on
FDA labeling requirements.
3. The Story of Bendectin: A Practical Example
Bendectin, a drug prescribed to alleviate nausea and vomiting
accompanying pregnancy,189 is a practical example of litigation’s effect on
innovation, drug prices, and—ultimately—availability of the drug itself. First
introduced to the U.S. market in 1956, Bendectin achieved great success; by
the time its manufacturer withdrew Bendectin from the market, it was sold in
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 217-22.
Id. at 206.
Id.
Id. at 223.
Lasagna, supra note 172, at 337.
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twenty-two countries and used by around twenty-five percent of pregnant
women in America.190 Epidemiological research into Bendectin’s effect on
birth defects produced mixed results.191 The FDA also investigated Bendectin,
determining that “this drug has been the most carefully studied of all drugs
which could be used to treat the nausea and vomiting of pregnancy. There is
no evidence that any other drug is safer in treating [this condition].”192 Yet
many suits came to trial, and although Merrell (Bendectin’s manufacturer) won
the great majority of them, the company pulled Bendectin from the market
citing unsustainable legal costs.193 Consequently, pregnant women lost the only
prescription drug then available for treating nausea and vomiting.194
4. Overdose: How an Increase in Prescription Drug Costs is Especially
Problematic for Oklahoma
Due to Oklahoma’s population demographics and other economic factors,
the prescription drug cost increases Wyeth v. Levine portends will prove
exceedingly harmful to the state. Senior citizens, who invariably utilize
prescription drugs more than adults and children, make up a significant portion
of Oklahoma’s population.195 According to the AARP, thirteen percent of
Oklahoma’s population is age sixty-five or older.196 This figure places
Oklahoma ahead of thirty states in terms of percentage of the population over
sixty-five years old.197 Eighteen percent of Oklahoma’s population is between
the ages of fifty and sixty-four.198
Oklahoma also has a high number of individuals lacking health insurance
coverage, especially among the elderly.199 In 2007, 94,551 Oklahomans
between the ages of fifty and sixty-four were uninsured.200 Moreover, thirty
percent of Oklahoma’s seniors in 2007 were not eligible for the Medicare Part
D Low Income Subsidy—meaning they had to pay the full cost of their

190. Id. at 338.
191. Id. at 339.
192. Id. at 340.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See AARP, WHY HEALTH CARE REFORM IN OKLAHOMA 1 (2009), available at http://
assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/state_hcb_09_ok.pdf.
196. Id.
197. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RANKING OF STATES BY PROJECTED PERCENT OF POPULATION
AGE 65 AND OVER: 2000, 2010, 2030 (2004), http://www.census.gov/population/www/
projections/projectionsagesex.html.
198. AARP, supra note 195, at 1.
199. See id.
200. Id.
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prescription medications for at least part of the year.201 By comparison,
twenty-three percent of Florida’s seniors, nineteen percent of Arizona’s
seniors, and twenty-seven of Utah’s seniors were ineligible for the Medicare
Part D Low Income Subsidy in 2007.202
In sum, Oklahoma’s demographic realities mean an increase in prescription
drug costs generated by Wyeth will disproportionately affect the state. Due to
greater incidences of illness and disease, senior citizens’ consumption of
prescription drugs far exceeds prescription drug consumption among other
population groups.203 Not only does Oklahoma’s senior citizen population
surpass that of most states, but also the number of seniors in Oklahoma who
are ineligible for prescription drug subsidies under Medicare is greater than in
traditional retirement destinations such as Florida and Arizona.204 Therefore,
the Wyeth case should be of particular concern to Oklahomans already
struggling to pay for prescription drugs.
B. Wyeth v. Levine Will Benefit Oklahoma Tort Practitioners
Wyeth v. Levine will affect Oklahoma in a second, noteworthy way: by
enabling plaintiffs to sue drug manufacturers post-FDA approval, Wyeth will
encourage the proliferation of failure-to-warn claims, which will in turn
encourage the proliferation of Oklahoma tort practitioners’ business.
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Wyeth, injured consumers could
not bring actions against pharmaceutical companies in Oklahoma for
inadequate warnings on FDA-approved drugs; an Oklahoma federal court had
held that FDA labeling requirements preempted failure-to-warn claims brought
pursuant to Oklahoma state law.205 With the Supreme Court’s ruling in Wyeth
v. Levine, however, Oklahoma plaintiffs are now much more likely to achieve
201. JACK HOADLEY ET AL., T HE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE MEDICARE PART D
COVERAGE GAP: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES IN 2007 6 (2008), available at http://www.
kff.org/medicare/upload/7811.pdf. That amounts to about 66,550 people who had to pay 100%
percent of their prescription drug costs. THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., STATE HEALTH FACTS
(2007), http://www.statehealthfacts.kff.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=3.
202. HOADLEY ET AL., supra note 201, at 6.
203. A study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention found that eighty-seven
percent of Americans over the age of sixty-five surveyed from 2001-2004 reported using
prescription drugs in the past month. Only sixty-six percent of 45-65 year-olds and thirty-eight
percent of 18-44 year-olds said they had used prescription drugs in the past month. CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PRESCRIPTION DRUG USE IN THE PAST MONTH BY AGE, SEX,
RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: UNITED STATES, 1988-1994 AND 2001-2004 1 (2008), available
at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus08.pdf#098.
204. See HOADLEY ET AL., supra note 201, at 6.
205. See Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (W.D. Okla. 2008). See supra Part
II.D. for a detailed summary of the case’s holding.
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positive outcomes in suits against drug companies because drug companies
will be hard-pressed to argue that federal law preempts state failure-to-warn
claims.206
Scholars and attorneys agree that the increased likelihood of success by
plaintiffs whose claims FDA regulations would have previously preempted has
shifted incentives in favor of trial lawyers. “Some trial lawyers who have been
hesitant to bring claims against pharmaceutical companies are now going to
be more willing to do so,” Benjamin C. Zipursky, professor of law at Fordham
Law School in New York City and visiting professor at Harvard Law School,
states.207 Referring to Wyeth, corporate defense attorney John Beisner echoed
the sentiments of Professor Zipursky, saying, “We’re going to see a substantial
uptick in the number of cases filed.”208
Indeed, the weeks immediately following the Supreme Court’s Wyeth
decision saw judges in state and federal courts around the country permit
upwards of 250 previously stayed lawsuits to move forward.209 Moreover,
recent data suggests that jurors are becoming more sympathetic to plaintiffs in
product liability cases.210 Last year, the five most lucrative product liability
verdicts rose fifty-two percent, with Pfizer—perhaps the best-known
pharmaceutical company in America—losing verdicts of $78 million and $34
million.211 “It’s a reflection of the fact that Main Street is hurting,” said Tobias
Millrood, attorney for the plaintiffs in the $34 million case against Pfizer.212
“In this climate [alluding to the recent financial collapse and economic
downturn], there’s a strong identification with the little man,” said Millrood.213
All told, Wyeth v. Levine is a positive development for Oklahoma’s tort bar.
Bound by Wyeth, Oklahoma courts must now reject preemption defenses they
previously allowed to block state failure-to-warn claims against
pharmaceutical companies. Accordingly, Oklahoma tort practitioners can
henceforth successfully try cases they would not have even taken before
206. See supra Part III.B for a thorough discussion of the Supreme Court’s holding in Wyeth
v. Levine.
207. Amanda Gardner, Supreme Court Rejects Limits on Drug-Injury Lawsuits, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT, Mar. 4, 2009, http://www.usnews.com/health-news/managing-yourhealthcare/policy/articles/2009/03/04/supreme-court-rejects-limits-on-drug-injury.html.
208. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Jurors Turned Against Companies in 2009 Product-Defect
Cases, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 7, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
&sid=awwb48rn7sQQ.
209. Id.
210. See id. (stating five of the fifty largest verdicts were claims involving defective
products).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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Wyeth. Combined with a growing sensibility favoring product liability
plaintiffs in the wake of the worst recession since the Great Depression, the
ability to sue drug companies for failure to warn despite compliance with FDA
regulations means Wyeth v. Levine will serve as a boon to Oklahoma’s tort
practitioners. Nonetheless, a victory for the tort bar is not a victory for the
average Oklahoma citizen. That Wyeth will enable tort lawyers to grow their
practices excuses neither the Supreme Court’s flawed legal reasoning nor the
growth in prescription drug prices the decision will doubtless produce.
VI. Conclusion
Wyeth v. Levine is among the most consequential preemption cases of our
time, which makes the Supreme Court’s failure to reach the proper result very
troubling. The Court misconstrued preemption doctrine, deviating from wellestablished principles and avoiding the direct applicability of recent case law.
Perhaps more worrisome was the Court’s inability to grasp the economic
implications of its decision. Without the shield of FDA approval, drug
manufacturers will face a barrage of state tort lawsuits—and the result will be
climbing prices for prescription medications. While the rise in litigation is
welcome news for Oklahoma trial lawyers, it has the potential to be
catastrophic for the state’s many seniors—who already struggle to afford the
medicines vital to their health. The Supreme Court should revisit Wyeth v.
Levine and overturn its wrongheaded decision at the first
opportunity—restoring the FDA to its position as the rightful arbiter of drug
safety by ruling that FDA regulations preempt contrary state lawsuits.
Because the fact is, Wyeth v. Levine is a dose of bad medicine Oklahoma
cannot afford.
Tyler R. Barrett
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